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also federally taxed. People decide to buy the good at the most advantageous price. Namely 
they can buy bootlegged cigarettes and, if the price is very high in both provinces, they can 
decide to buy smuggled cigarettes, on which no tax is levied. The two provinces engage in tax 
competition. The province tax-reaction function are non linear because of scale economies in 
the cost of bootlegging. An increase in federal tax offsets the non linearity, because it 
decreases the magnitude of the horizontal externality. We test the theoretical results by using 
Canada-US data set from 1984-1994. 
 
Keywords: horizontal externality, vertical externality, tax competition, tax rate. 
JEL classification: H21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*I wish to thank Tim Besley, Umberto Galmarini, Jim Hines, Valentino Larcinese for discussions and 
comments. I also thank participants to seminars at Catholic University of Milan in February 2003, EEA at 
Stockholm University in August 2003, UK Public Economic Weekend at Leicester in December 2003.  
**University of Ferrara, Department of Economics, Corso Ercole d’Este 44 – 44100 Ferrara. E_mail: 
l.rizzo@economia.unife.it 
 
 
1 Introduction
Vertical and horizontal fiscal relations must be explored if European nations
want to increase the size of EU budget, by giving more fiscal power to the
European Parliament. Italy is also nowadays, facing a similar problem after
the recent approval by the Parliament of the Constitutional reform about the
relationship between central state and regions. The new Constitution calls for
more fiscal power to the regions which can be obtained only by letting some tax
bases overlap.
There are federal provinces like US and Canada, where many tax bases over-
lap without apparently big problems. This seems to contrast with traditional
fiscal federalism literature (Musgrave (1959); Oates (1972)) which prescribes
a fiscal imbalance between federal and local government. Decentralization of
fiscal expenditure does not correspond to the same level of decentralization for
the taxes necessary to finace it: many taxes cannot be decentralized because
of the tax-base mobility threat, which could arise tax-competition phenomena,
unabling the local authority to raise the revenue it need. Moreover, a pro-
gressive income tax should be centralized to preserve horizontal equity between
individuals living in diﬀerent states of the federation. These problems seem
not to worry Canada, where the main provincial tax bases (like corporate and
personal income or sales) are shared with the federal government. What drives
the public finance Canadian system to work, given so big a tax decentralization
on mobile tax bases? One simple explanation may be that the mobility eﬀect
is very small. Another, more appealing, is that the particular relation between
vertical and horizontal externality mitigate the eﬀect of the tax-base mobility
threat.
We explore this issue by using a model with two provinces choosing taxes
on a mobile tax base, which is also taxed by a federal state. People decide to
buy the good at the better price. Important diﬀerences in province’s taxes can
cause relevant bootlegging phenomena. These, in the cigarette market, involve
(Thursby and Thursby, 2000) the purchase of goods in low tax jurisdictions. The
goods are then transported into high tax provinces, where counterfeit stamps
are used to allow their sale along. In general bootlegging involves transporting
cigarettes over relatively short distances. In this context a change in tax by
one province aﬀects the other province’s tax base (horizontal externality), that
responds by changing its tax. On the other end the so-called "wholesale smug-
gling" is a very big threat on the revenue of all provinces (Joossens et al., 1992) in
a federal country, which does not depend on the relationship between provinces’
taxes. In this case, in fact, smugglers do not pay taxes either in the selling, or
in the purchasing province. This type of smuggling is a big problem for those
goods with high federal taxes. A change in tax by the federal government aﬀects
all provinces’ tax base (vertical externality), inducing an appropriate reply by
every province. In our model the greater the total tax (federal + state tax), the
bigger the quota of total consumers in the province who decide to buy the good
in the "wholesale-smuggling" market, causing a decrease in the provinces’s tax
base. Notice that, since this does not correspond to an increase in the other
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provinces’s tax base as in the bootlegging case, it causes an increase in each
state tax in the attempt to recover the lost tax revenue. On the contrary the
tax-competition process, due to bootlegging and cross-border shopping drives
tax rates to the bottom: tax rates, for a given federal tax, are lower than they
would be without tax-base mobility. We use a data set 1984-1994 for Canada
and US and test the eﬀect of an increase in federal tax on cigarettes on the hor-
izontal tax-competition on cigarettes. We find that the federal tax rate aﬀects
the neighboring average tax rate in explaining the variance of the own tax rate.
In fact it oﬀsets the non linearity of the tax-reaction functions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we
examine the related literature, in the third and forth section we develop the
theoretical model. Section 5 tests the model and section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Johnson (1988) first, highlighted that state residents would prefer redistribution
to be undertaken by state rather than federal government. This is because part
of the increase in the use of redistributive income taxation is born indirectly
by residents of other states by virtue of their being federal tax payers. The
federal government would be in fact obliged to increase its federal tax if it
wants to respect its public budget constraint, giving the depressing eﬀect on
the tax base of the state deciding to increase the use of redistributive income
taxation. On the line of this work Boadway, Marchand, Vigneault (1998) studied
the implication of this externality phenomenon for the optimality of resources
allocation in a federation. They explored the externalities in the bottom-up and
top-down direction: both types of exernalities are present if we assume that the
federal and state government play a Nash game; only the bottom-up (state
versus federal government) holds if we assume a Stackelberg game. Moreover
if the federal state can implement contingent transfers, vertical and horizontal
externalities will be nullified. Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) study the vertical
and horizontal externalities in a model with capital taxation, where capital is
mobile. They also examine the welfare properties of a Nash and Stackelberg
equilibrium, highlighting the case when the vertical externality prevails on the
horizontal and vice-versa.
There are some empirical works on vertical externalities. Besley, Rosen
(1998) estimate the existence of vertical fiscal externalities for cigarettes and
gasoline in US, by relating the own state tax rate to the federal government
tax rate. They find a positive link between state and federal tax rate on ciga-
rette and gasoline with a US data set for the year 1975 to 1989. Esteller-Moré,
Solé-Ollé (2001) find a positive sign for vertical externality by using US data for
income tax during the period 1987-96. This sign is not very robust to compara-
tive statics. In fact in Boadway and Keen (1996) an increase in the federal public
expenditure due to a higher federal tax rate can induce the local government
to react by lowering local public expenditure and indeed local income tax rate
(public expenditure eﬀect). Andersson et al.(2004) find a negative sign, explor-
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ing the relation between counties and municipal income tax rates for Sweden
with a panel data 1981-1990.
Other empirical literature concentrates on estimating vertical and horizontal
fiscal competition togheter. Goodspeed (2000) uses a data set with 13 OECD
provinces for the period 1975-1984. A poverty index is used as a measure of
intra-province mobility: the poorer the less mobile people are, the smaller the
horizontal externality. He uses local income tax as dependent variable and finds
negative sign for the federal tax rate and for the mobility index. Boadway and
Hayashi (2001), using Canadian annual data 1963-1996, test horizontal and ver-
tical tax competition by looking at corporate taxes on businesses. They find a
negative sign for the vertical externality and positive for the horizontal external-
ity. Each estimate is for a single province or an average province. Revelli (2003)
studies the non-metropolitan two-tier system of local government in England -
comprising 34 counties and 238 districts - using per capita current expenditure
for the financial year 2000/2001, disaggregated in various functions of inter-
est. He finds that horizontal externality disappears when a vertical externality
coeﬃcient is introduced, arguing that the relevant externality is just the last
one. Interestingly, with tax variables Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2004)
find the opposite for US by using a panel data 1977-1997: vertical external-
ity for cigarettes and gasoline is not significant if they also test for horizontal
externality, which is significant.
Goodspeed (2002), extending some results of Goodspeed (2000), finds that
the vertical externality aﬀects the horizontal externality (measured as in Good-
speed (2000)) in an income tax enviroment, by oﬀsetting it. However, the paper
does not present structural explanations of the result.
3 The model
Consider a federation with two provinces with equal populations. Consumers
in the two provinces diﬀer in their utility function for preference for the local
public good. Two goods are produced: a mobile taxed good and an immobile
good, whose price we take as numeraire. The two goods are produced, by using
one input with constant returns to scale. Each resident can decide where to
buy the consumption good, according to the post-tax price and the cost of
bootlegging the good. Each province decides upon a local public good and a
tax on the mobile good according to the destination principle. The good can be
transported not for personal consumption, but to be resold, from the low tax
province to the high tax province (bootlegging) and in this case a combination
of transport cost and storage cost is incurred to buy the good (Scharf, 1999).
This is the relevant empirical situation we focus on, for cigarette tax in Canada.
Let us index the two provinces as 1 and 2. Both have the same number of
residents, normalized to 1 and uniformly distributed over n ∈ [0, 1]. We assume
that the extremum 0 is the border of the province. Since the residents are
uniformly distributed, the distance of each resident from the border is d ∈ [0, 1] ,
coinciding with the distribution of the residents. Assume that each consumer
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in province 1 has the following utility function:
U(x, y) = u(x) + y + γs ln g +Ψ lnG with s = 1, 2,
where x ∈ {0, 1} is the taxed good; y is the numeraire no-mobile good, g is the
local public good, G is the federal public good, γ1 6= γ2 > 0 is a parameter which
determines the preference for the local public good respectively in province 1
and 2, Ψ is a parameter, determining the preference for the federal public good,
which we is assumed identical in each province and u(0) = 0. The source of
heterogeneity between the residents in the two provinces is the propensity to
consume the local public good.1A symmetric equilibrium would make no sense
in a federation, whose nature implicitly recognizes the existence of structural
and tastes heterogeneity.
The ln function let us have a clear-cut FOC for the public good, but this
does not aﬀect the final results, which is aﬀected by the quasilinear formulation
of the utility function. This says that there is no link between public and private
good. It seems reasonable that there is not any public good, which increases
the utility due to one more cigarette.
It is more diﬃcult to justify the perfect substitutability with the untaxed
good. There is no reason why this should not be linked to the taxed good,
but on the other side this assumption allows to get a constant marginal utility
of income, since we have only two private goods. This let us underline the
deadweightloss eﬀect, due to the tax on the x-good (Besley, Rosen, 1998): the
more the tax rate increases, the greater the loss in utility, because the more it
costs to consume 1 unit of the x-good. Since y enters linearly in the primitive
utility function, this last result does not depend on the level of income.
The mobile good is dichotomous following the Kanbur and Keen (1993)
formulation. This is of great help in obtaining tractable reaction functions.
In the cigarette case it is, moreover, reasonable to think of the demand for
these goods, as to be very rigid. Finally it helps to isolate the role of mobility in
determining the change in tax-base elesticity after a change in its own neighbor’s
tax rate: if the demand is rigid the only determinant of the change of the tax-
base elesticity is mobility.
3.1 The third stage
The following assumptions are useful (Rizzo, 2002):
Assumption 1: u(1) − p > 0, where r = u(1) − p is the reservation price
for the mobile good, net of production cost, of a consumer living either in 1 or
2.
The meaning of this assumption is that it is always worth it for the consumer
to buy the good x when it is not taxed.
1This will later allow us to skip out symmetric equilibria, for which static comparative
results are note definite.
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Assumption 2: The cost of bootlegging per consumption unit is given by:
φ(d) =
ln(1 + d)
A
(1)
where d is the distance of the consumer from the border and A ≥ 1 is a fixed
parameter.
Think of the cigarette bootlegger, that, for a given quantity to be provided,
minimizes its cost during a certain time period. This implies that, the further
from the border the market place, the lower the optimal number of trips and the
greater the amount of good purchased in every trip.2 This decreases the fixed
transaction cost per unit of consumption, which, with a non increasing per unit
storage cost, insures concavity of the unit cost of bootlegging in the distance
from the border (Scharf, 1999). In a stylized model, such as the one presented
here, this reasoning can be summarized by a cost of bootlegging concave in the
distance from the border.
Notice that (1) is an increasing and concave function of d and φ(0) = 0.
When A → ∞, we are in the perfect mobility case, in fact φ(d) = 0 ∀d, and
A = 1 implies the minimum mobility case and therefore the maximum possible
unit cost of bootlegging. Notice that the intensity of the scale economies in
the bootlegging technology is captured by A: the higher A, the lower the unit
cost of bootlegging per unit of distance from the border. Finally, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1
implies 0 ≤ φ(d) ≤ ln 2A .We use a logaritmic function, because it let us get some
interesting explicit results, which would have not been possible with a more
general form, because of the ambiguous sign of the third order derivatives. We
are indeed assuming that the magnitude of the third order derivatives is not so
big to overcome the eﬀects due to the second and first order ones.
3.1.1 The shopping technology
Let us define t2 as the specific unit tax on the mobile good in province 2. Assume
that t1 > t2, if assumption 1 holds and t1+T ∈ [0, r], the consumer in 1 decides
where to buy the good by comparing its indirect utility derived from buying
the legal or the bootlegged good. If it shops bootlegged goods from 2, it pays
φ (k)+ t2+T. Therefore the consumer will shop bootlegged goods from 2 until:
φ (k) = t1 − t2.
If we use (1):
k = [φ(t1 − t2)]−1 = eA(t1−t2) − 1 (2)
Notice that the level of T does not enter in determining k, because the federal
tax is identical in both provinces.3 The variable k is the distance from the border
2Fitz Gerald et al. (1995) show evidence of this. They analyzed two case-studies: Germany-
Denmark and Ireland-Northern Ireland. In both cases the greater the distance from the border,
the greater the amount of goods purchased and the fewer the trips in any given period.
3This has also been highlighted in Devereux, Lockwood, Redoano (2004). It is the reason
why, in a model with zero demand-elasticity of the taxed good (Kanbur and Keen, 2003), they
do not get any vertical externality, even if mobility is allowed.
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of the consumer in province 1, who is indiﬀerent between shopping legally in
1 or a bootlegged good from 2. Moreover, since consumers in 1 are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1], k is also the number of residents in 1, buying bootlegged
goods, for a given t1 − t2. Note that k is convex in t1. The higher t1, the
bigger the increase in the number of people buying from 2, for a given increase
in t1 ( ∂k∂t1 > 0 and
∂2k
∂t21
> 0). This is because the higher t1, the further from
the border the indiﬀerent consumer is, the lower the increase in the bootlegging
cost is (∂
2φ
∂d2 < 0).
If t1 ≤ t2, we obtain an expression symmetric to (13), with opposite prop-
erties for the second order derivative of the bootlegging cost function: l =
eA(t2−t1) − 1.
3.2 The second stage
If assumption 1 holds, t1 ∈ [0, r] and t2 ∈ [0, r], it will always be economic
for consumers in 1 to buy good x. In this case, taking account of the initial
assumption that the number of people is normalized to 1 and using the results
from the third stage, we have that if t1 > t2, B1 = 1− k(t1, t2) and if t1 ≤ t2,
B1 = 1+ l(t1, t2), where B1 is the tax base faced by province 1. We can simplify
the notation by defining:
n(t1, t2) =
½
−k(t1, t2) if t1 > t2
l(t1, t2) if t1 ≤ t2.
(3)
It follows that:
B1 = 1 + n(t1, t2)
where n is the mobile tax-base quota coming in or going out depending on which
tax regime we are dealing with.
The same reasoning applies to province 2.
g −B1(t1 + T ) ≤ 0. (4)
3.2.1 Tax evasion
Price diﬀerentials among provinces create incentive for bootlegging, while high
taxes create incentive for wholesale smuggling, from now on simply smuggling.
As already discussed in the introduction smuggling occurs when cigarettes are
sold without payment of tax or duties even in the province of origin and, more
important, this is a long distance phenomenon. Therefore it aﬀects the tax base
in all the federation, without regards to the distance from the border of the
provided consumer. We model the tax base loss due to smuggling as:
E1 = αB1 (t1 + T ) (5)
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where E1 is tax evasion in province 1 and α is a constant, which reflects the
level of controls and corruption in the province. Tax evasion in province 1
is a characteristic positively linked to the number of individuals (B1), legally
shopping in their province, if t1 > t2, plus those living in 2 and shopping
bootlegged goods from 1, if .t1 ≤ t2.
It is reasonable to think that tax evasion, which is driven by the quota of B1,
shopping in the smuggling market, increases when the total tax rate (t1 + T )
increases. Moreover since tax evasion is increasing in B1 and (t1 + T ), tax
evasion is also increasing in B1 (t1 + T ) for a given α. In (5) we assume that tax
evasion is linked to this last expression by a linear function. Notice that if both
provinces increase their tax, t1 and t2, of the same amount, B1 does not change,
but E1 increases via t1: if the level of state taxes increases of the same level, a
quota of people in both states switches to smuggled products. The same thing
happens if T increases.
3.2.2 The local government problem
If t1+T ∈ [0, r] and t2+T ∈ [0, r], in the second stage, province 1 maximizes the
indirect utility function of a representative resident shopping at home, subject
to a budget constraint, by solving the following problem:
Max
t1,g,µ
u(1) +m− (p+ t1 + T ) + γ1 ln g1 +Ψ lnG (6)
−µ {g − (B1t1 −E1)}
The following assumptions are useful:
Assumption 3: r < 1A .
The meaning of assumption 3 is that, the bigger the scale economies (the
greater A) in the bootlegging technology, the smaller the unit net reservation
price can be. The greater A is, the less costly to buy the bootlegged good.
Assumption 4: 0 < α < 3−
√
5
2 .
We assume that the quota of revenue lost, because people go to the smug-
gling market is no more than 0.38 of the total revenue (provincial + federal),
collected in the province. This assumption defines the α − set which, together
with assumptions 1-3, allows us to prove the existence of a subgame perfect
equilibrium in federal and local tax rates and public goods.
3.3 The first stage: the federal government problem
The federal government maximizes a function which is the sum of the welfare
functions of the two provinces (Boadway, Marchand, Vigneault, 1998; Keen,
Kotsogiannis, 2002). The federal government moves first, by choosing G and
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T , that maximize its objective function. After that, at the second stage, local
governments choose their local tax rates and public goods and therefore:
Proposition 1: If assumptions 1-4 hold then the Stackelberg game where a
central authority chooses a federal tax rate and a federal public good, by maximiz-
ing a its welfare function, subject to a budget constraint and the two provinces
choose their tax rates and public goods by maximizing their welfare function,
subject to a budget constraint, has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: see appendix.
The existence of a federal tax induces each province belonging to the fed-
eration to modify its tax-rate decision, taking into account the eﬀect on the
resident’s tax base of the federal tax.
4 The federal tax and the slope of the province
reaction functions
An increase in T (section 3.2.1), decreases the revenue in both provinces, because
smuggling increases, making the provincial tax base decrease. In our setting the
tax reply to a neighboring tax increase is linked to the amount of tax base coming
in from the increasing tax province, which decreases because of the federal tax
increase. Therefore the magnitude of the horizontal fiscal externality decreases.
It is useful to look at the anlytical formula of the impact on the horizontal fis-
cal externality of an increase in the federal tax: ∂L1∂t2∂T = −µ
h
α ∂n∂t2 −
∂2n
∂t2
∂t2
∂T (t1 − α (t1 + T ))
i
.
A quota of the tax base "going to province 1", because of the increase in tax
in the other province, ∂n∂t2 , is oﬀset by the increase in tax evasion, due to the
increase in T ,−α ∂n∂t2 .
4 An increase in the vertical externality, oﬀsets part of the
horizontal externality eﬀect.
Since we can test this, by using the slopes of the tax rate reaction function,
we start by totally diﬀerentiating the FOC of (11), to derive the slope of tax-rate
reaction function of province 1, for a given marginal cost of public funds:
dt1
dt2
= −
∂2n
∂t1∂t2 (t1 − α (t1 + T )) +
∂n
∂t2 (1− α)
∂2n
∂t21
(t1 − α (t1 + T )) + 2 ∂n∂t1 (1− α)
(7)
(22) catches only the so called deadweight loss eﬀect (Besley, Rosen 1998).
According to this, a tax increase in province 2 leads to an increase of the tax
rate in province 1: the deadweight loss, for a given marginal cost of public
funds, is minimized by increasing its own tax and therefore its own revenue.
Another eﬀect is not considered: the revenue eﬀect (Smart, 1998). This leads
4Moreover this eﬀect is stronger if t1 > t2, because in this case ∂
2n
∂t2
< 0, due to the
concavity of the bootlegging cost function. Conversely the eﬀect is milder if t1 < t2. In this
case in fact ∂
2n
∂t2
> 0.
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to a decrease in tax rate after an increase in the neighbor’s rate, because the
government need a lower tax rate to raise the same level of revenue, after the
increase in t2: the marginal cost of public funds decreases. The final eﬀect on
the tax rate is therefore ambiguous. If this last eﬀect is not very high, as it seems
to be from the flypaper literature5 (Inman, 1971; Case, Hines and Rosen, 1993),
(22) can be considered a good proxy of the reaction function slope, obtained by
endogenizing the marginal cost of public funds.
We describe the reaction function’s slope, for given marginal cost of public
funds and derive all the propositions, which will follow, for a given marginal cost
of public funds, because we assumed welfare maximizing provinces and therefore
face a six-sumultaneous equation system with six unknowns (t1, g1, µ1, t2, g2, µ2).
It is theoretically possible to partially solve the six-equation system and get a
reaction function linking t1 to t2, where µ1 is endogenized. Unfortunately this
function is not properly estimable, because it would be a structural equation
estimate of the six-equation system with a missing variable, namely the endog-
enized µ1. We estimate, in fact, a linear approximation of :
1− µ
·
(1 + n (t1, t2))(1− α) + [t1 − α(t1 + T )]
∂n (t1, t2)
∂t1
¸
= 0,
which is the first order condition with respect to t1 from the maximization of
the welfare function of province 1.
From (22) we get:
Proposition 2: If assumption 1-4 hold then, for a given marginal cost of
public funds and a fixed t2, dt1dt2 > 0.
Proof: see appendix.
This is because an increase in t2, decreases the migrating tax-base quota, for
a given t1, if t1 > t2, or increases the migrating tax-base quota, for a given t1,
if t1 < t2. Therefore if t2 increases, province 1 is induced to increase t1, with
respect to the situation before the increase in t2, in the process of providing g
by minimizing its deadweight loss, for a given marginal cost of public funds.
Proposition 3: If assumptions 1-4 hold, then the slope of the tax-rate
reaction function when t1 > t2 is greater than the slope of the tax-rate reaction
function when t1 < t2, for a given marginal cost of public funds and a given t2.
Proof: see appendix.
This proposition comes from the the concavity assumption of the cost of
bootlegging in the distance from the border, which implies that the further
people are from the border, the less the bootlegging cost increases when that
distance from the border increases. In fact if t1 > t2, for a given increase in t2
(which means a decrease in the distance from the border of the consumer in 1,
who is indiﬀerent to buy legally in 1 or bootlegged goods from 2), the increase
in the number of people willing to buy legally in 1 decreases with t2, for a
5We can think of the tax base flow, due to the increase in t2, as money transfer to province
1.
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given t1. If t1 < t2, for a given increase in t2 (which means an increase of the
distance from the border of the consumer in 2, who is indiﬀerent to buy legally
2 or bootlegged good from 1), the increase in the number of people illegally
shopping increases with t2, for a given t1 (see fig. 1). Therefore province 1, for
a given increase in t2, is induced to increase more t1 in the former case than in
the latter one. In the former case an increase in t1 causes a loss in the benefit
from the increase in t2, lower than in the latter case.
Proposition 4: If assumption 1-4 hold then (a) a unit increase in the
federal tax decreases the tax-rate reaction function slope if t1 > t2, moreover (b)
it increases the tax-rate reaction function slope if t1 < t2, for a given marginal
cost of public funds and a given fixed t2.
Proof: see appendix.
As we have just seen, if t1 > t2, for a given increase in t2, the increase in the
number of people illegally shopping goods bootlegged from 2 decreases with t2,
for a given t1. The decrease is smaller when the federal tax increases, because
tax evasion increases and a quota of tax base disappears. Therefore the loss in
benefit due to an increase in t1 after the increase in t2 is higher than before the
increase in the federal tax. That is why the reaction of 1 to an increase in t2 is
smother when T increases.
If t1 < t2, for a given increase in t2, the increase in the number of people
illegally shopping goods bootlegged from 1, increases with t2, for a given t1. A
quota of this increase will disappear if we introduce the federal tax and so tax
evasion increases. Hence, the loss in benefit due to an increase in t1, after the
increase in t2 is lower than before the increase in the federal tax. That is why
the reaction of 1 to an increase in t2 is stronger after an increase in T .
4.1 Testable theory
In the paper we focus on assumption 2, which we think is the most reasonable
for cigarette bootlegging and test the following hypotheses:
1) ∂t1∂t2 > 0
2) dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
> dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
3)
·
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯
T>0
− dt1dt2
¯¯¯
T=0
¸
t1>t2
< 0 and
·
dt1
dt2
¯¯¯
T>0
− dt1dt2
¯¯¯
T=0
¸
t1<t2
> 0
Assumption 2 is indirectly tested, by veryfing its eﬀect on the reaction func-
tion slope (inequality 2). After doing that, we test wheather the diﬀerence in
slopes is aﬀected by the existence of the federal tax (inequality 3).
5 The empirical test
Our main goal is to estimate if there is any significant strategic link between
federal and provincial taxation, when tax is levied on the same tax base. In
the literature this has been done by regressing local tax rate on federal tax rate
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(Besley, Rosen, 1998). The method normally prevents from checking for year
eﬀects, because the federal tax rate in a panel-data set does not have the state
dimension and the insertion of the year eﬀects results into an insignificant coef-
ficient for the federal tax rate. The typical objection in these works is that the
federal tax-coeﬃcient is significant because it picks up yearly macroeconomics
shocks. A way out of this problem could be to estimate the eﬀect of a change in
federal tax on the tax-competition behaviour, which shows oﬀ when the tax base
is mobile. If an increase in federal tax aﬀects the tax-rate choice of a province,
given the tax rate on the same mobile tax base of a neighboring province, it
means that there is a link between the tax rate, chosen at federal and local
level on the same tax base. This is also, what our theory shows: if a federal
authority intervenes by introducing a central tax, it modifies the local tax base
and increases the deadweight loss each local authority would bear with only its
local tax; this implies that a local authority modifies the choice of its tax and
so the tax-rate answer to an increase in tax rate from a neighboring state. We
test this idea by using a Canada-US data set from 1984-1994.
In our case we argue that tax competition is due to bootlegging. This is likely
to happen between border provinces: the further a province from the other, the
more costly (in transport terms) is to bootleg. At a first glance bootlegging
could not appear a relevant threat for the provincial tax base in the Canadian
reality, where provinces are very big and densities very low. But at a further
inspection, almost all the Canadian population lives near the US border. Notice
that eight, out of the ten considered provinces,6 border the US. This means that
population in each of these provinces is concentrated along a line, which makes
the bootlegging threat between provinces or the US a relevant problem. This is
reinforced by the fact that in two, out of the eight provinces bordering the US
(Nova Scotia, New Brunswick), bootlegging is a relevant issue, just because they
are very small. The two provinces not bordering the US are P.E.I, which is very
small and Newfoundland which is basically extended along the Quebec border:
both characteristics play an important role for the relevance of bootlegging.7
In order to isolate the independent impact of the neighboring tax rates on the
Canadian province tax, one must take into account other variables, that might
aﬀect the provinces tax rate. First of all we control for the US neighboring
tax rates. Moreover the province’s tax rate on commodities depends on several
other types of variables. Province taxation can be influenced by economic and
6We excluded the three Territories Nunavut, Northwest Territories and Yukon because
they represent a very small part of Canada in terms of population, income and tax base.
7How Canadian provinces relate their tax decisions on cigarettes seems to be an important
issue, according to the provisional agenda on tobacco control of the World Health Organization
meeting in 1999: “diﬀerentials in the price of tobacco....lead to both casual cross-border
shopping and illegal bootlegging. Cross-border sales may occur within countries, such as
Canada and United States, given the intracountry price diﬀerences among Canadian provinces
and states within the United States”. Moreover, this issue seems to worry also the national
print: "Cigarettes are smuggled interprovincially by road, through mail-order operators, by
commercial couriers ....The smugglers have little fear of the law." (Moon, The Globe and Mail,
28 June 1997)
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demographic environment. We controlled for it by using many socio-economic
variables (see data appendix). For all of them we computed the corresponding
mean variables of the neighboring Canadian provinces and neighboring US states
to each Canadian province. The political colour of the provincial government
can also aﬀect the tax-rate level: we divided the Canadian party system in three
main groups: the conservative-progressive, which is right wing, the liberals,
which is center, and left wing group, composed by the Democratic-Progressive,
the Quebec party and the Social Credit party. We have then built dummies for
the case when the premier belongs to one of the three groups. Finally we have
dichotomous variables to control for province and year eﬀects. We estimate the
following equations:
tst = ςs + δ1hst + δ2vt + δ4EXPEst + δ5mst + ϑxst + st (8)
tst = αs + βt + λ1hst + λ2vt ∗ hst + λ3EXPEst + λ4mst + θxst + st, (9)
where: tst is the tax rate for province s and year t; αs are province fixed eﬀects;
βt are dummies variables that pick up for macro-shock and common change in
fiscal policies; xst is a vector of province specific time varying shocks; hst is the
tax-rate average of the neighboring provinces of province s in year t; vt is the
federal tax rate in year t; EXPEst is the ratio of the total expenditure on GDP
for province s in year t; mst is the tax-rate average of the neighboring US states
of province s in year t; st is the error term.
Equation (8) estimates the eﬀect of an increase in federal tax, by omitting
year eﬀects and using some invariant year controls (federal GDP and federal
unemployment). Equation (9) estimates the eﬀect of an increase in federal tax
through the tax-competition coeﬃcient, controlling for year and province eﬀects.
5.1 Hypotheses
Equation (8) estimates two parameters: δ1, which is the tax-rate reaction coef-
ficient to an increase in the tax-rate average of the neighboring provinces and
δ2, which is the tax-rate reaction coeﬃcient to an increase in federal tax-rate.
Here, we take the traditional approach, estimating the link between a federal
tax and a local tax, levied on the same tax base.
Equation (9) does not include the federal tax, but the interaction term vt∗hst
and controls for year eﬀects. The interaction accounts for the change in tax-
rate reaction to an increase in the tax-rate average of the neighboring provinces,
after a change in federal tax. From our theory, δ3 could be both positive, or
negative, depending on the prevailing tax regime (tst > hst or tst < hst).
We estimate λ1 = γ1 + γ2ψ and λ2 = γ3ψ, where ψ is a dummy which
equals 1 for provinces where tst > hst. Therefore γ1 is the slope of the tax-rate
reaction function in the case tst < hst and γ1 + γ2 + γ3vt is the slope of the
tax-rate reaction function in the case tst > hst, for a given federal tax rate vt.
Proposition 3 predicts γ2+γ3vt > 0: the slope of the tax-rate reaction function
in the case tst > hst is higher than in the case tst < hst. Moreover proposition
4 predicts γ3 < 0: when tst > hst, an increase in the federal tax rate decreases
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the coeﬃcient of the rate reaction function, due to an increase in the tax-rate
average of the neighboring provinces.
We then estimate λ1 = ϕ1+ϕ2 (1− ψ) and λ2 = ϕ3 (1− ψ) , where ϕ1 is the
slope of the tax-rate reaction function in the case tst > hst and ϕ1 + ϕ2 + ϕ3vt
is the slope of the tax-rate reaction function in the case tst < hst, for a given
federal tax rate vt. Proposition 3 predicts ϕ2 + ϕ3vt < 0: the slope of the tax-
rate reaction function in the case tst < hst is lower than in the case tst > hst.
Proposition 4 says that ϕ3 > 0: when tst < hst, an increase in the federal tax
rate increases the coeﬃcient of the tax-rate reaction function, after an increase
in the average rate of the neighboring provinces.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
In theoretical section we describe a two stage game a la Stackelberg. We are
empirically interested in the second stage where we face a system of six simulta-
neous equations: three from the solution of the optimal tax problem of province
1, which determines t1, g1 and µ1, for a given t2; and three from the symmetric
tax problem solved by province 2, which determines t2, g2 and µ2, for a given
t1. In the empirical specification we can think of t1 as the Canadian province
tax rate (tst) and t2 as the mean of the neighboring province tax rates (hst).
By using not all the neighboring variables but just the mean, we reduce the em-
pirical situation to a two-province problem: each province competes with one
fictitious (average) neighboring province. This is quite a usual procedure in the
literature (Hines et al. 1993; Besley, Rosen 1998; Brueckner, Saavedra 2001;
Esteller-Moré, Sollé-Ollé, 2001), especially when the spatial dimension must be
emphasized.
Like all studies of social interactions, this economic framework suﬀers from
an identification problem of the model’s structural equations and a simultaneity
bias of the standard errors of the equation estimated. The issues arise because
tax-rate interactions are symmetric, in the sense that each province’s behavior
aﬀects that of its neighbors in the same way, the neighboring provinces behavior
aﬀects the province’s own behavior, which feeds back again on the neighbors.
We tackle these two problems firstly by identifying one of these six equations,
the first order condition with respect to the tax choice of province 1; and sec-
ondly, by instrumenting the endogenous variables to cope with the endogeneity
bias. We have two endogenous variables, if we assume a Stackelberg model: the
average neighboring tax rate, t2, and the marginal cost of public funds, µ1. In
a model of simultaneous equations, the federal tax rate is also endogenous. If
we want to correctly identify the estimated equation, we need variables which
are correlated with t2, µ1and T (if we use a simultaneous decision model), but
not to t1.
Equation (9) can be written as follows:
tst = αs+βt+γ1hst+γ2ψhst+γ3ψvthst+γ4EXPEst+γ5mst+θxst+st (10)
The vector x is composed by 23 variables: INCst and its square, GRANTst,
UNEMPst, GDPst (per-capita GDP), POPst, AGEDst, CHILDst andDENSst;
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the neighboring Canadian variables for INCst and its square, GRANTst, UNEMPst,
GDPst, DENSst and symmetric variables for the neighboring US provinces,
two dummies for the political colour of the premier. Moreover macroeconomic
shocks and province fixed eﬀects are controlled through 10 dummies for year
eﬀects and 9 dummies for province eﬀects.
5.2.1 Instrumentation
The mean Canadian neighboring tax rate and its interactions are endogenous,
because they can also be influenced by the Canadian province. The marginal
cost of public funds (endogenous from the theoretical model) is proxied with
total government expenditure over GDP (EXPEst), using the first order condi-
tion of the theoretical model relative to the optimal choice of the public good.8
The mean neighboring US tax rate, mst could clearly be endogenous: the US
rate mean can also be influenced by the Canadian province.
If this is the structural model, a simple OLS estimate of (10) would suﬀer
from endogeneity and measurement error bias: the error term st would be cor-
related with the error terms of the other simultaneous equations of the system.
The endogeneity bias comes from the fact that we are dealing with simultaneous
equations; the measurement error bias is because we have no exact measure of
the marginal cost of public funds, µ, that we have had to proxy. We use the
two-stage least squares method: first we estimate the reduced forms of the six
endogenous variables and then we substitute their fitted values into (10). The
residuals of this last equation are corrected by using the actual values of the
endogenous variables.9
We define a vector of instruments, composed by 10 variables: GRANT, INCTAX,and
the mean Canadian and US neighboring variables for POP,AGED,CHILD
and INCTAX. We argue that these variables, not appearing in (10), aﬀect
hst, ψhst, ψvthst, EXPEst and mst, but are uncorrelated with tst. The vector
allows us to identify equation (10), which has five endogenous variables.
We instrumented the mean Canadian neighboring tax rate hst, γψhst, ψvthst
with the neighboring Canadian variables for POPst, AGEDst, CHILDst INCTAXst.
The level of taxation, and in a reduced form equation also the tax rate
on cigarettes, is in fact normally linked to the size of population: these vari-
able influence the available tax base and the cost of public goods. Moreover age
structure influences taxation, according to the relative preference for social poli-
cies. It is reasonable to think of these neighboring variables not aﬀectinng the
8The first order condition with respect to g is:
∂L
∂g
=
γ1
g
− µ = 0.
For more analytical details see appendix.
9The two-stage least square strategy would deliver residuals using the fitted values of the
endogenous variables. Since we are estimating the structural model, we are interested in the
residuals using the actual values of the endogenous variables.
We execute the procedure, by using the ivreg command of STATA, which already gives the
corrected residuals with the actual values of the endogenous variables.
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province’ s tax rate on cigarettes. The inclusion of INCTAXst is explained by
the fact that the federal income tax can influence the provincial tax and there-
fore provincial taxes on cigarettes in a reduced form equation (Besley, Rosen,
1998).
We instrumented the mean US neighboring state tax rate with the same
corresponding variables.
Spatial error dependence can arise when the error includes some omitted
variables not captured in the covariates, which are themselves spatially de-
pendent. If the spatial dependence is ignored, estimation may be bayesed
(Brueckner, 2001; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001). We sort out this problem
by controlling for more than one variable, giving reason of the neighboring eco-
nomic enviroment: the neighboring Canadian variables for INCst and its square,
GRANTst,UNEMPst, GDPst and symmetric variables for the neighboring US
provinces. These variables, if omitted, can generate a spurious correlation be-
tween its own tax and the neighboring tax or other exogenous covariates.
Finally, we instrumented also EXPEst with GRANTst and INCTAXst .
These two variables are all important in determining the tax rate on cigarette
not directly, but indirectly trough the level of public expenditure. The more
grant a province receives, the higher its public expenditure for a given level of
taxation. The inclusion of INCTAXst is explained by the fact that the federal
income tax, can influence the provincial income tax and therefore the provincial
total revenue. (Besley, Rosen, 1998)
It is important to notice that GRANTst and INCTAXst can also proxy
time-varying provincial shocks (business cycle) and so result in missing variables
in the second stage equation. We control for this in the second stage equation,
using UNEMPst, INCst and its square, and GDPst.
Moreover, in the second stage equation we also control for POPst and its
square, CHILDst, AGEDst and DENSst. We control finally for the eﬀect
of politics on the tax-rate choice, by using two dummies accounting for the
governor progressive-conservative and liberal. We also control for year and
province eﬀects. We reply the same estimate for the complementary tax regime
tst < hst.
After performing the two-stage least square regressions we test the validity
of the instruments, regressing the residuals from the second stage equation on
the instruments and all the exogenous variables, running an F-test on the joint
significance of the instruments.
We also estimate (9), where the federal tax-rate is in, instrumenting it with
the federal deficit (therefore the instruments variables become 11), when we
test for the simultaeous decision model: it is reasonable that the federal deficit
influences the choice of the federal tax, but not the choice of the local tax. In
this case, since we do not have fixed year eﬀects, we control for cyclical macro-
economics shocks with federal GDP and federal unemployment. The estimated
equation is identified because the endogenous variables are four (hst, vt, mst,
µst) and the instruments eleven.
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5.3 Results
We start, by testing for vertical externality only (table 2, column 1), controlling
for socio-eonomic characteristics, province eﬀects and yearly macroeconomic
shocks. The coeﬃcient of the federal tax turns out to be 0.82 and significant
at 1%. In the second column we add the neighboring tax variables for Canada
and US: the coeﬃcient decreases of more than 100% (0.39) and it becomes
significant at 5%. If then we control for the neighboring economic enviroment,
by adding some neighboring socio-economic variables, the mean of the Canadian
neighboring tax rates remain almost the same, whereas the federal tax rate
coeﬃcient decreases of almost 50% and is no more significant.
In table 3 column 1 we run a two stage least square regression, where, ac-
cording to our theory (Stackelberg model), we instrument the mean Canadian
neighboring tax rate. We get a significant horizontal tax-competition coeﬃcient,
and again not significant vertical tax competition coeﬃcient, but with a much
lower t-statistics than before.10 This regression performs a very bad overiden-
tification test (p-value=0.04). It means that the instruments are not good, or
that the specification is not correct because some variable, correlated with the
instuments is missing.11
In column 2 we try a specification, where the federal tax is instrumented
(simultaneous tax decision between diﬀerent government levels). The federal
tax coeﬃcient becomes bigger, but still not significant. The overidentification
test is better (0.19), but still not satisfactory at all. We, therefore, estimate
(column 3) a new regression, where we add an interaction of the neighboring
tax with a dummy accounting for the case when tst < hst, and do not instrument
the federal tax: we get a coeﬃcient for the federal tax very similar to that of
column 2 and the neighboring tax coeﬃcient a bit bigger, but interestingly the
overidentification test jumps to 0.45. This is still not satisfactory, but it gives
a hint that the previous specification (column 1, table 3) was not correct and
that the problem was not the endogeneity of the federal tax, but the missing
interaction.
However in the regression of column 3, we do not obtain significant t-
statistics for both the interaction term and the federal tax-rate coeﬃcient.
In this regression, even if we do not use year eﬀects, we control for macro-
economic shocks, by using federal GDP and federal unemployment, which are
very collinear to the federal tax, a province invariant variable. This, with the
inclusion of the mean neighboring rate, which, if a vertical tax externality holds
(Besley and Rosen, 1998 for US cigarette and gasoline tax), could cause the low
10Note the interesting diﬀerence with the opposite result in Revelli (2003), where the decision
variable is public expenditure: the introduction of a control for expenditure from a higher
government layer makes the horizontal externality disappear. On the converse this result is
confirmed by Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2004) findings.
11The residuals could include this variable, which, if related with the instruments, will also
be reflected in the coeﬃcients of the instruments, when we regress the residuals on all the
covariates plus the instruments to test the null hypothesis that the instruments are jointly
diﬀerent from 0. It follows that the test is weakened by the correlation between the instruments
and the missing variable which is included in the residuals.
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t-statistic for the federal tax coeﬃcient and the interaction term. A way out
from this puzzle is to estimate a fixed-eﬀect model, dropping the federal tax
coeﬃcient. We also adopt a more accurate specification of the interaction term,
according to the tax regime, which follows our theoretical model.
Specifically, we look at the interaction of the federal tax with the tax-
competition coeﬃcient. We (column 1, table 4) estimate the horizontal tax-
competition coeﬃcient for a given vt, when tst < hst, ϕ1 + (ϕ2 + ϕ3vt), and
the eﬀect on this coeﬃcient of an increase in the federal tax: ϕ3. In a second
regression (table 4, column 2), we repeat the same test for the case tst > hst,
estimating the coeﬃcient γ1 + (γ2 + γ3vt) and the eﬀect on the coeﬃcient of
an increase in the federal tax: γ3. The direct federal tax eﬀect is accounted
for in the year eﬀects. We used the same instruments as before. In the first
regression (column 1) ϕ2 = −2.994 with not very high t-statistics (this can be
due to correlation with the other tax-rate terms) and ϕ3 = 1.547 and more than
5% significant. It means that if tst < hst then the tax-rate slope decreases with
respect to the other complementary tax regime (proposition 3). This trend is
counteracted by ϕ3, which is positive (proposition 4): the greater the increase in
the federal tax, the bigger the tax-rate slope. Notice that the overidentification
test (F>0.8) increases considerably with respect to the previous regression in
column 3, table 3: the added variables, related to the tax regime were really
missing in the previous regression. When we estimate the second regression
(column 2) we get γ2 = 3.061 and γ3 = −1.61; both coeﬃcients are more than
5% significant: if tst > hst, then the tax-rate slope increases with respect to
the other complementary tax-regime (proposition 3). This trend is contrasted
by γ3, which is negative (proposition 4): the bigger the increase in the federal
tax-rate, the smaller the tax-rate slope. Also in this case the overidentification
(F >0.86) btest is much higher than in that of column 4, table 2.
The reason why we use two regressions to estimate the eﬀect of an increase
in federal tax on tax competition in the two diﬀerent tax regimes, is that the
tax rates in the two tax regimes are quite correlated (correlation index:-0.54).
In fact, if we put them together (column 3, table 3), the t-statistics become very
low, but interestingly the coeﬃcients do not change a lot. The coeﬃcients of the
neighboring tax (computed as function of the federal tax, when it is set equal to
1) for the case tst > hst is downward biased (3.061-1.610-0.162= 1. 289 instead
of 3.014-0.119-1.381= 1. 514). This is because the interaction in column 3 is
positive ( 1.442) and the correlation between the interactions relative to the two
regimes is negative. There is a very slightly positive bayes in the coeﬃcient of
the neighboring tax (computed as function of the federal tax, when it is set equal
to 1) for the case tst < hst (-2.994+1.547+1.529= 0.082 instead of 1.442-1.381=
0.061 ). Analogously the reason for the bias is that the interaction in column 3
is negative (-0.119) and the correlation between the interactions relative to the
two regimes is negative.
Notice that in both regimes the coeﬃcients of the neighboring taxes inter-
acted with the federal taxes in column 1 and 2 of table 4 mantain the signs they
have in column 3 of table 4, which are those predicted by the theoretical model:
-0.119 ( column 3), -1.610 (column 2) and 1.442 (column 3), 1.547 (column 1).
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6 Conclusions
We theoretically assess the eﬀect of federal and local tax base overlapping,
when the tax base is mobile and rection functions are non linear, because the
cost of moving the tax base from one province to another is non linear in the
distance from the border. The introduction of a federal tax decreases the fiscal
externality due to tax base mobility. In our model, this means partial oﬀsetting
of the non linearity of the reaction functions.
We test whether the provincial governments of Canada are aware of this
mechanism, by looking at provinces changes of tax rates if neighboring provinces
change theirs and so the federal government. We derive the reaction function
slopes according to two diﬀerent complementary tax-rate regimes, which are
also function of the federal tax.
The paper develops a test of the theoretical result by using a data set for
Canada and US running from 1984 to 1994, with sales taxes and specific cigarette
taxes.
We show evidence that an increase in the federal tax decreases tax compe-
tition due to tax-base mobility, by oﬀsetting the non-linearity of the reaction
functions. This result has a fiscal policy relevance: tax-base overlapping could
also have some beneficial eﬀect, when tax bases are mobile. Namely if a federal
tax is implemented on a mobile tax base, there would be less need for inter-state
or provincial compensating transfers. Notice that the vertical externality has
always been seen as source of ineﬃciency in tax decisions; Keen, Kotsogiannis
(2002); Boadway, Marchand, Vigneault (1998); Goodspeed (2002)).
Several extensions of this work are possible. On the empirical side, it would
be useful to collect data on border densities and border lengths. It is reason-
able to think that each state fixes its tax rate, being aware of the neighboring
rates, where population density near the border and the length of the border are
greater. On the theoretical side it would be interesting to explore the political
economy reasons, which could determine the ambiguous sign of the vertical ex-
ternality found in previous literature: friendly provinces could decide to sustain
the federal authority willing to increase the federal tax, by decreasing theirs,
others, not friendly, could do the opposite.
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7 Data Appendix
tst is the Canadian cigarette tax rate, inclusive of general sales tax, for province
s in year t, divided by the CPI and PPP index. These rates are from the
National Clearinghouse on Tobacco and Health for Canada: the tax rates are
already provided as the sum of the unit tax-equivalent of the general sales tax
plus the unit tax rate. They are expressed in Canadian dollars per pack of 20.
7.1 Endogenous variables
vt federal Canadian cigarette tax rate, inclusive of general sales tax. This is also
from the National Clearinghouse on Tobacco and Health for Canada.
hst is the mean of the tax rates in year t of the Canadian provinces neigh-
boring on province s, divided by the CPI and PPP index.
mst is the mean of the tax rates of the US states neighboring province s
in year t. The tax rates on cigarettes for the United States are taken from
www.library. unt.edu/gpo/acir/acir.html: they are expressed in US dollars per
pack of 20 cigarettes. Tax rates on sales are also taken from www.library.unt.edu/
gpo/acir/acir.html: they are expressed in percentage of the price. The final tax
rate is calculated by taking the unit-tax equivalent of the general sales tax
(which is obtained multiplying the general sales tax-rate by the price), adding
this to the unit tax-rate.
EXPEst is the total province expenditure divided by the GDP for province
s in year t. Total province expenditure comes from www.statcan.ca for Canada.
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7.2 Demographic and economic variables
POPst is the number of persons in province s in year t. It comes from www.statcan.ca
for Canada and www.census.gov for the United States.
DENSst is calculated as the total population (POPst) divided by the area
for province s in year t. Areas are expressed in square miles: for Canada
from www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/Land/Geography/phys01.htm and for the
US from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html.
CHILD ratio of individuals who between 5-17 to the total population of
province s in year t. The number of individuals who are between 5-17 comes
from www.statcan.ca for Canada and www.census.gov for the United States.
AGEDst ratio of individuals who are over 65 to the total population of
province s in year t. The number of individuals who are over 65 comes from
www.statcan.ca for Canada and www.census.gov for the United States.
UNEMPst unemployment rate for province s in year t. From www.statcan.ca
for Canada and from www.stats.bls.gov for the US.
INCst per-capita income for province s in year t divided by the CPI and PPP
index. Income comes from www.statcan.ca for Canada and from www.bea.doc.gov
for the US.
GRANTst federal grant-in-aid over GDP for province s in year t. Federal
grant-in-aid comes for the US from “Federal Expenditures by State” which
is part of the Consolidated Federal Funds Reports program from US Census
Bureau and for Canada from www.statcan.ca.
GDPst per-capita GDP for province s in year t. GDP comes from www.statcan.ca
for Canada and www.bea.doc.gov for the US.
INCTAXst federal tax revenue over GDP for province s in year t. Federal
tax-revenue comes from www.statcan.ca for Canada and from www.bea.doc.gov
for the US.
We computed two dichotomous variables to account for the party of the
premier (Progressive Conservative and Liberal).
From http://www.swishweb.com/Politics/Canada.
The PPP (Parity Purchasing Power) index for Canada-US was downloaded
by the OECD web site.
US cigarettes price per pack comes from The Federal Tax Burden on Ciga-
rettes, Vol. 27, 1996.
The CPI comes from the Statistical Abstracts of the United States (2000).
8 Appendix
Recall that the provincial government solves the following problem:
Max
t1,g,µ
u(1) +m− (p+ t1 + T ) + γ1 ln g1 +Ψ lnG. (11)
The federal government, given the second stage equilibrium tax rates of the
21
local governments, solves the following problem:
Max
T,G,Ω
2u(1) + 2m− 2p− 2T − t1 − t2 + 2Ψ lnG+ γ1 ln g1 + γ2 ln g2 (12)
−Ω [G− (2T −E1 −E2)]
where Ω is the marginal cost of federal public funds, E1 = α (t1 + T )B1 is
province 1’s government estimate of the revenue loss due to tax evasion linked
to the sum of local and federal revenue raised from the same tax base, B1 =
1+n (t1(T ), t2(T )) , and E2 = α (t2(T ) + T )B2 is province 2’s government esti-
mate of the revenue loss due to tax evasion linked to the sum of local and federal
revenue raised from the same tax base, B2 = 1−n (t1(T ), t2(T )); n (t1(T ), t2(T ))
represents mobile people, aﬀecting local tax bases: this depens on T through
t1(T ) and t2(T ),which are the second stage Nash-equilibrium tax-rates. There-
fore the federal budget constraint can be written as: G− 2T+
α [t1 (T ) + T ] [1 + n (t1(T ), t2(T ))] + α [t2 (T ) + T ] [1− n (t1(T ), t2(T ))] ≥ 0.
8.1 Some results from the paper
If t1 > t2:
k = [φ(t1 − t2)]−1 = eA(t1−t2) − 1 (13)
where k is the distance from the border of the consumer in province 1, who is
indiﬀerent between shopping legally in 1 or a bootlegged good from 2. Moreover,
since consumers in 1 are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], k is also the number of
residents in 1, buying bootlegged goods, for a given t1 − t2.
If t1 ≤ t2:
l = [φ(t2 − t1)]−1 = eA(t2−t1) − 1 (14)
where l is the distance from the border of the consumer in province 2 who is
indiﬀerent between shopping legally in 2 or bootlegged goods from 1. l is also the
number of residents in 2, buying bootlegged goods, for a given t2 − t1. Finally:
n(t1, t2) =
½
−k(t1, t2) if t1 > t2
l(t1, t2) if t1 ≤ t2.
(15)
8.2 Proofs
Lemma 1: If assumptions 1-2 hold, the second stage subgame tax-rate equi-
librium strategies must necessarily belong to t1 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
and t2 ∈h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
.
Proof: Assume that at the second stage t∗1 ∈
h
0, α1−αT
h
]r − T,+∞[ is a
feasible strategy for some t2, then W (t∗1, t2, T ) > W (t
∗∗
1 , t2, T ), where t
∗∗
1 ∈h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
.
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This is a contradiction because t∗1 ∈
h
0, α1−αT
h
implies g < 0, which cannot
hold, because one of the constraints of the local government problem is g ≥ 0.
Moreover if t1 + T > r, then g = −k(t1, t2) [t1 − α (t1 + T )] < 0, when t1 >
t2 and g = 0 [t1 − α (t1 + T )], when t1 < t2. The former case cannot hold for
the reason just discussed and the latter case would imply W = −∞ and so,
if we use assumption 2, W (t∗1, t2, T,G) = m + γ1 ln(0) ≤ W (t∗∗1 , t2, T,G) =
u(1)−p− t∗∗1 −T +m+γ1 ln {(1 + n) [t∗∗1 − α (t∗∗1 + T )] +Ψ1 lnG} This proves
the lemma.
Lemma 2: If assumptions 1-3 , 4 and T > α1−αr holds, then the the
subgame-perfect-equilibrium federal tax rate must necessarily belong to T ∈h
α
1−αr, (1− α)r
i
.
Proof: Remember W (T,G) = 2u(1) + 2m − 2p − 2T − t1(T ) − t2(T ) +
γ1 ln g1(T ) + γ2 ln g2(T ) + Ψ1 lnG + Ψ2 lnG. Note that from the second stage
g1 = [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] t1 − α [t1 (T ) + T ] [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] and g2 =
[1− n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] t2−α [t2 (T ) + T ] [1− n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] and thatG = 2T−
α [t1 (T ) + T ] [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))]− α [t2 (T ) + T ] [1− n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] .
If T ≥ α1−αr, which implies T (1− α) ≥ αr, we can write:
2T (1− α) ≥ 2αr ≥ 2αmax [t1, t2] ≥ α [t1 (1 + n) + t2 (1− n)]
which is:
2T (1− α)− α [t1 (1 + n) + t2 (1− n)] ≥ 0,
This says that the budget constraint is non negative.
We have seen that at the second stage, if assumption 2 holds the provinces
always choose t1 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
and t2 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
. This let us state
that the condition which guarantees a subgame perfect equilibrium is: T ≤
(1 − α)r. Only in this case the previous two sets are not empty. Suppose the
condition does not hold and let us assume that the federal government chooses a
T > (1−α)r, it means ts ∈ [0, r − T ]
h
α
1−αT,+∞
h
. This would imply a negative
revenue for province s when ts ∈ [0, r − T ] , but this choice cannot belong to
the strategy set because the provinces maximize their welfare function under
a non-negative revenue constraint. So the strategy choice of province s (s=1,2)
restricts to ts ∈
i
α
1−αT,+∞
h
, which means that the tax base is always 0 in
both provinces. This implies that the federal revenue is also 0, which means
W (T,G(T )) = −∞. Since lemma 1 ( ts ≤ r − T, with s = 1, 2) insures that
2u(1)+2m−2p−2T−t1−t2 > 0, we can stateW (T ∗, G(T ∗)) ≥W (T ∗∗, G(T ∗∗))
where T ∗ ∈
h
α
1−αr, (1− α)r
i
and T ∗∗ ∈
h
0, α1−αr
i
[(1− α)r, r]
Note that, since 0 < α < 3−
√
5
2 , the set T
∗ ∈
h
α
1−αr, (1− α)r
i
, is not empty.
Proposition 1: If assumptions 1-4 hold then the Stackelberg game where a
central authority chooses a federal tax rate and a federal public good, by maxi-
mizing its welfare function, subject to a budget constraint and the two provinces
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choose their tax rates and public goods by maximizing their welfare function,
subject to a budget constraint, has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Since assumption 2 holds, we can apply lemma 1 and define the
following strategy sets for each province of the federation at the second stage of
the game:
α
1− αT ≤ t1 ≤ r − T
α
1− αT ≤ t2 ≤ r − T
These two sets are compact, non-empty and convex.
The pay-oﬀ function of province 1 is:
W (t1, t2) = u(1)+m1− (p+ t1+T )+γ1 ln {(1 + n) (t1 − α (t1 + T ))}+Ψ1 lnG
(16)
(16) is the welfare function of province 1 with the budget constraint fitted in.
This function is continuous in ∀t1 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
. It is easy to verify the
continuity in t1 > t2 and t1 < t2. Moreover the limit of the function when
t1 → t2 coincides in the two regimes (t1 > t2 and t1 ≤ t2): lim
t1→t+2
W (t1, t2) =
lim
t1→t−2
W (t1, t2) = u(1) +m− (p+ t1 + T )− f + γ1 ln (t1 − α (t1 + T )) +Ψ lnG.
This proves the continuity also when t1 = t2. Taking the derivative of (16):
∂W
∂t1
= −1 + γ1
g
·
∂n
∂t1
(t1 − α (t1 + T )) + (1 + n) (1− α)
¸
. (17)
The first order derivative of the pay-oﬀ function is a continuous function in
t1 = t2. In fact its limit when t1 → t2 coincides in the two regimes: lim
t1→t+2
∂W
∂t1 =
lim
t1→t−2
∂W
∂t1 = −1 + γ1
−A[t1−α(t1+T )]+1−α
t1−α(t1+T ) .
Take the derivative of (17):
∂2W (t1, t2)
∂t21
=
γ1
g2
"µ
(t1 − α (t1 + T ))
∂2n
∂t21
+ 2
∂n
∂t1
(1− α)
¶
g −
µ
∂g
∂t1
¶2#
(18)
if we use (15) and (13), when t1 > t2:
∂2W (t1, t2)
∂t21
=
γ1
g2
"
−AeA(t1−t2) [A (t1 − α (t1 + T )) + 2 (1− α)] g −
µ
∂g
∂t1
¶2#
.
(19)
Notice that assumption 5 and lemma 1 imply:
∂2W (t1, t2)
∂t21
< 0.
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If we use (15) and (14), when t1 < t2:
∂2W (t1, t2)
∂t21
=
γ
g2
"
AeA(t1−t2) [A (t1 − α (t1 + T ))− 2 (1− α)] g −
µ
∂g
∂t1
¶2#
.
(20)
Assumption 3 and 4 imply:
t1 ≤ r ≤
1
A
<
1
A
+
α
1− αT
which means that:
∂2W (t1, t2)
∂t21
< 0.
The first-order derivative of the pay-oﬀ function has a kink in t1 = t2. In
fact if we take the limit of the second-order derivative when t1 → t2 in the two
regimes: lim
t1→t+2
∂2W
∂t21
6= lim
t1→t−2
∂2W
∂t21
. But since the pay-oﬀ function is continuous
and diﬀerentiable in t1 = t2 and concave in t1 < t2 and t1 > t2, it must be
concave ∀t1 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
, whatever t2 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
.
Notice that the set of maximizers t1(t2) is non-empty and compact since
the pay-oﬀ function is continuous and the strategy set, where t1 is chosen,
( α1−αT ≤ t1 ≤ r) is non-empty and compact. The set of maximizers t1(t2)
is also convex since the pay-oﬀ function is concave in t1 and the strategy set
is convex. The above properties ensures that the reaction function t1(t2) is
continuous and convex-valued. The same reasoning applies to province 2. We
can therefore apply Kakutani fixed point theorem and say that the game, where
the two provinces choose their own tax-rate and local public good by maximizing
their welfare function, has a Nash equilibrium.
We have proved the existence and uniqueness of the second stage sub-game
equilibrium.
The first-stage federal welfare functionW (T,G(T )) = 2u(1)+2m−2p−2T−
t1(T )− t2(T )+γ1 ln g1(T )+γ2 ln g2(T )+Ψ lnG(T )+Ψ lnG(T ). Note that from
the second stage g1 = [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] t1−α [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] (t1 + T )
and g2 = [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] t2 − α [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))] (t2 + T ) and that
G = 2T−α [t1 (T ) + T ] [1 + n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))]−α [t2 (T ) + T ] [1− n (t1 (T ) , t2 (T ))].
Since (17) is a continuous function in t1 and T , ∂t1∂T exists for ∀T ∈
h
α
1−αr, (1− α)r
i
and therefore t1(T ) is continuous for ∀
h
α
1−αr, (1− α) r
i
. Of course the same
holds for t2(T ). Moreover since n(t1, t2) =
n
−[eA(t1−t2)−1]if t1>t2
eA(t2−t1)−1 if t1≤t2.
is also con-
tinuous for ∀t1 ∈
h
α
1−αT, r − T
i
, we can say that W (T,G(T )) is continuous in
T .
Finally, since, at the first stage, the federal state maximize W (T,G(T )), by
choosing T , which by lemma 2 belongs to the compact set T ∈
h
α
1−αr, (1− α) r
i
,we
can apply the Weierstrass Theorem and establish that a subgame-perfect equi-
librium exists.
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Proposition 1a: If assumptions 1-4 hold, an increase in the federal tax,
for given marginal cost of public funds, µ, implies for each province a higher tax
rate, given the tax rate of the other province fixed.
Proof: Sove problem (11), for a given µ and g:
∂L
∂t1
= −1− µ
·
− ∂n
∂t1
[t1 − α (t1 + T )]− (1 + n) (1− α)
¸
= 0 (21)
by totally diﬀerentiating (21) with respect to t1 and T :
dt1
dT
=
α ∂n∂t1
2 ∂n∂t1 +
∂2n
∂t21
(t1 − α (t1 + T ))
when t1 > t2, by using (13) and (15): dt1dT =
α
2+A[t1−α(t1+T )] , which, by lemma
1, is positive. When t1 < t2, by using (14) and (15): dt1dT =
α
2−A[t1−α(t1+T )] .
Notice that this last expression is always positive because by assumptions 3 and
4 t1 ≤ r < 1A <
2
A(1−α) +
α
1−αT.
We can rule out the case t1 = t2, in fact since γ1 6= γ2, t1 = t2 cannot be an
equilibrium.
Notice that if we diﬀerentiate with respect to t1 and t2, we obtain:
dt1
dt2
= −
∂2n
∂t1∂t2 (t1 − α (t1 + T )) +
∂n
∂t2 (1− α)
∂2n
∂t21
(t1 − α (t1 + T )) + 2 ∂n∂t1 (1− α)
(22)
Proposition 2: If assumption 1-4 hold then, for a given marginal cost of
public funds and a fixed t2, dt1dt2 > 0.
Proof: When t1 > t2, by using (13) and (15): dt1dt2 =
(1−α)+A(t1−α(t1+T ))
2(1−α)+A(t1−α(t1+T )) .
Notice that (1− α)+A (t1 − α (t1 + T )) ≥ 0 . In fact 1−α > 0, by assumption
4 and A (t1 − α (t1 + T )) ≥ 0, by lemma 1. This implies that the denominator
is positive.
When t1 ≤ t2,by using (14) and (15): dt1dt2 =
(1−α)−A(t1−α(t1+T ))
2(1−α)−A(t1−α(t1+T )) . Since
the numerator is positive if t1 ≤ r < 1A <
α
1−αT +
2
A which is always true
by assumptions 3 and 4. If the numerator is positive, the denominator is also
positive.
We can rule out the case t1 = t2, in fact since γ1 6= γ2, t1 = t2 cannot be an
equilibrium.
Proposition 2a: If assumptions 1-4 hold, an increase in the federal tax T,
decreases the horizontal fiscal externality, for a given t1 and marginal cost of
public funds.
Proof: Notice that the analytical expression for the horizontal externality is:
∂L
∂t2 = µ
∂n
∂t2 (t1 − α (t1 + T )) . Taking the derivative of this last expression with
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respect to T, for a given t1and given 2’s optimal choice, t2(T ), at the second
stage:
∂L
∂t2∂T
= −µ
·
α
∂n
∂t2
− ∂
2n
∂t2
∂t2
∂T
(t1 − α (t1 + T ))
¸
When t1 > t2, if we use (13) and (15), we get ∂L∂t2∂T = −µαAe
A(t1−t2)
h
2+A(1−α)(t2−t1)
2+A(t2−α(t2+T ))
i
.
The denominator is positive by lemma 1. Moreover 2 + A (1− α) (t2 − t1) >
2 + A (1− α) (min t2 − max t1) = 2 − A (1− α) r; notice that assumption 3
(r < 1A ) implies 2 − A (1− α) r > 2 − (1 − α), which by using assumption 4
(0 < α < 3−
√
5
2 ) and the previous inequality leads to 2+A (1− α) (t2 − t1) > 0.
This shows that the numerator of the fraction in square barackets is positive.
All this implies ∂L∂t2∂T < 0.
When t1 < t2, if we use (14) and (15), we get ∂W∂t2∂T = −µαAe
A(t2−t1)
h
2−A(1−α)(t2+t1)+2αAT
2−A(t1−α(t1+T ))
i
.
The denominator is positive by assumptions 3 and 4: t1 ≤ r < 1A <
α
1−αT +
2
A ; the numerator is positive, in fact 2 − A (1− α) (t2 + t1) + 2αAT > 2 −
A (1− α) 2r+2αAT , morever assumption 3 (r < 1A ) implies 2−A (1− α) 2r+
2αAT > 2− (1− α) 2 + 2αAT , which, by using the previous inequality and as-
sumption 4, (0 < α < 3−
√
5
2 ), gives 2−A (1− α) (t2 + t1) + 2αAT > 0, namely
∂L
∂t2∂T < 0. The symmetric case t1 = t2 is ruled out by assumption 1: γ1 6= γ2.
Proposition 3: If assumptions 1-4 hold, then the slope of the tax-rate
reaction function when t1 > t2 is greater than the slope of the tax-rate reaction
function when t1 < t2, for a given marginal cost of public funds and a given
fixed tax rate.
Proof : When t1 > t2, by using (13) and (15): dt1dt2 =
(1−α)+A(t1−α(t1+T ))
2(1−α)+A(t1−α(t1+T )) .
Notice that assumptions 1, 3, 4 and lemma 1 insures that dt1dt2 =
(1−α)+A(t1−α(t1+T ))
2(1−α)+A(t1−α(t1+T )) >
1
2 . When t1 < t2, by using (14) and (15):
dt1
dt2 =
(1−α)−A(t1−α(t1+T ))
2(1−α)−A(t1−α(t1+T )) . Assump-
tions 1, 3, 4 and lemma 1 insures that dt1dt2 =
(1−α)−A(t1−α(t1+T ))
2(1−α)−A(t1−α(t1+T )) ≤
1
2 . Notice
that the case dt1dt2 =
1
2 can happen only in the t1 < t2 regime, in fact
dt1
dt2 =
1
2
if and only if t1 = α1−αT , which is not feasible in the regime t1 > t2. In fact in
this last case we should have t2 < α1−αT , which contradicts lemma 1.
This shows that dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1>t2
> dt1dt2
¯¯¯
t1<t2
We can rule out the case t1 = t2, in fact since γ1 6= γ2, t1 = t2 cannot be an
equilibrium.
Proposition 4: If assumption 1-4 hold then (a) a unit increase in the
federal tax decreases the tax-rate reaction function slope if t1 > t2, moreover (b)
it increases the tax-rate reaction function slope if t1 < t2, for a given marginal
cost of public funds and a given fixed t2.
Proof: Take t1 > t2, use (13) and (15) and take the derivative of (22) with
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respect to T :
∂t1
∂t2∂T
= −
A (1− α)2
³
α
1−α −
∂t1
∂T
´
[2 (1− α) +A (t1 − α (t1 + T ))]2
(23)
Suppose that ∂t1∂t2∂T > 0. This would imply:
∂t1
∂T =
α
2+A[t1−α(t1+T )] >
α
1−α .
This last inequality would imply (1 + α)+A (t1 − α (t1 + T )) < 0, which, given
lemma 2 and assumption 4, is impossible. Therefore if t1 > t2, then: ∂t1∂t2∂T < 0.
Take t1 < t2, use (14) and (15) and take the derivative of (22) with respect
to T :
∂t1
∂t2∂T
=
A (1− α)2
³
α
1−α −
∂t1
∂T
´
[2 (1− α) +A (t1 − α (t1 + T ))]2
(24)
Suppose that ∂t1∂t2∂T < 0 which implies
dt1
dT =
α
2−A[t1−α(t1+T )] >
α
1−α . This also
implies (1 + α)−A (t1 − α (t1 + T )) < 0, which means t1 > 1+α1−α +
α
1−αT , which
contradicts assumption 4 (t1 ≤ r < 1A ), given assumption 3 (A ≥ 1). Therefore
if t1 < t2, then ∂t1∂t2∂T > 0. Finally γ1 6= γ2 rules out the t1 = t2 case.
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Variable 
TAX (province unit cigarette tax, inclusive of general sales tax, 1989 US$) 0.9311 (0.3705)
C NEIGH TAX (neighboring Canadian province average unit cigarette tax, inclusive of general sales 
tax, 1989 US$) 0.8882 (0.3138)
Federal tax 0.8601 (0.3254)
US NEIGH TAX (neighboring US state unit cigarette tax, inclusive of general sales tax, 1989 US$)
0.2485 (0.1452)
EXPE (total province public expenditure divided by provincial gdp)
0.6184 (0.1510)
POP *10-7 (province population) 0.2718 (0.3110)
DENS*10-3  (population density: population divided by area) 12.7921 (11.2883)
UNEMP (unemployment rate)
11.4873 (3.7240)
AGED (proportion of population over 65) 0.1147 (0.0163)
CHILD (proportion of population between 5-17) 0.1920 (0.0171)
INC*10-3 (province income per capita in 1989 US$) 13.2187 (1.9920)
GRANT (federal grants divided by provincial population) 0.0011 (0.0005)
GDP (province  gdp per-capita in 1989 US million $) 0.1385 0.0309
INCTAX (federal income tax divided by provincial gdp) 0.0825 (0.0131)
C NEIGH DENS*10-3  (neighboring Canadian province average population density) 12.5121 (8.2137)
US NEIGH DENS*10-3  (neighboring US state average population density) 52.9159 (71.4226)
C NEIGH UNEMP (neighboring Canadian province average unemployment rate) 10.9308 (2.4546)
US NEIGH UNEMP (neighboring US state average unemployment rate) 4.8178 (2.6718)
C NEIGH INC*10-3  (neighboring Canadian province average population per-capita income in 1989 13.4088 (1.3908)
US NEIGH INC*10-3  (neighboring US state average  per-capita income  in 1989 US$) 12.7175 (6.5527)
C NEIGH GRANT (neighboring Canadian province average federal grant on provincial pop.) 0.0010 (0.0003)
US NEIGH GRANT (neighboring US state average  federal grant on state pop.) 0.0005 (0.0003)
US NEIGH INCTAX (neighboring US state average federal income tax on state gdp)
0.0806 (0.0104)
C NEIGH INCTAX (neighboring Canadian province average federal income tax on provincial gdp)
0.0710 (0.0361)
C NEIGH GDP (neighboring Canadian province average gdp per-capita in 1989 US million $) 0.0143 (0.0028)
US NEIGH GDP (neighboring US state average gdp per-capita in 1989 US million $) 0.0146 (0.0075)
C NEIGH POP (neighboring Canadian province average population) 3060374 (1942044)
US NEIGH POP (neighboring US state average population) 2474501 (3165001)
C NEIGH AGED (neighboring  Canadian province average proportion of population over 65) 0.1133 (0.0131)
US NEIGH AGED (neighboring US state average proportion of population over 65) 0.1034 (0.0522)
C NEIGH CHILD (neighboring Canadian province average proportion of population between 5-17)
0.1899 (0.009)
US NEIGH CHILD (neighboring US state average proportion of population beteween  5-17) 0.1540 (0.0779)
Federal GDP (Federal GDP in 1989 million $) 476244.3 (30030.71)
Federal unemployment rate 9.7272 (1.3761)
Deficit (federal deficit over federal gdp) -0.0496 (0.0093)
Notes: Figures are means, with standard deviations in parenthesis, based on annual data for the years 1984-1994, inclusive, for
the following ten Canadian provinces: Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island,
Nova Scotia, New Brunsweek, Quebec, Manitoba (110 observations).
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Dependent Variable
TAX: 
province cig.
tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
TAX: 
province cig. 
tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
TAX: 
province cig.
tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
0.822 0.390 0.226
(3.54)** (2.08)* (1.55)
0.615 0.567
(3.49)** (2.85)*
0.328 0.583
(0.50) (0.63)
-0.105 -0.356 0.568
(0.08) (0.23) (0.25)
0.159 0.123 0.193
(1.10) (1.02) (1.14)
0.131 0.172 0.165
(2.26)* (2.83)* (2.85)*
0.040 -0.141 0.067
(0.22) (0.87) (0.21)
-6.203 -10.654 -10.345
(0.63) (1.13) (1.37)
-12.152 -23.510 -17.430
(0.48) (0.99) (0.82)
-3.732 -0.893 -5.229
(0.82) (0.19) (0.66)
0.008 0.016 0.056
(0.16) (0.34) (2.34)*
-0.741 -0.647 -0.789
(1.10) (0.89) (1.56)
2.690 2.479 3.236
(1.02) (0.86) (1.56)
-14.272 -30.363 2.763
(0.45) (0.86) (0.08)
0.020 -0.011 0.005
(0.25) (0.14) (0.03)
-0.049 -0.084 -0.068
(0.90) (1.56) (0.39)
-0.007
(0.17)
0.094
(1.72)
UNEMP
INC*103
INC2 *108
C NEIGH UNEMP
US NEIGH UNEMP
POP *107
Dummy=1 if the premier of the
Government belongs to the
Progressive Conserv.
Dummy=1 if the premier of the 
Government belongs to the Liberals
dummy when TAX higher than C
NEIGH TAX 
DENS
CHILD
GDP
AGED
Table 2: The impact of  federal tax on provincial tax
Federal tax-rate on cigarettes+federal 
sale tax
C NEIGH TAX
dummy when equalization holds
EXPE
US NEIGH TAX
-1.435
(2.42)*
5.271
(2.24)
1.051
(2.61)*
-3.358
(2.71)*
-0.161
(0.46)
0.030
(0.49)
389.721
(0.75)
-1,938.169
(2.85)*
-16.937
(0.62)
142.326
(1.05)
0.003 0.014 0.032
(0.06) (0.35) (0.84)
4.02 4.22 5.24
(1.00) (1.33) (1.70)
6.318 7.551 5.876
(0.94) (1.10) (0.93)
year effects no no no
province effects yes yes yes
Observations 110 110 110
R-squared 0.81 0.85 0.91
Ftest on own controls (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0035
Ftest on NEIGH controls (p-value) 0.0002
Ftest on province effects (p-value) 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Constant
Federal unemployment rate
Federal GDP*106
Notes: Column (1) presents OLS regression of a Canadian province tax rate
on cigarettes on the federal tax rate on cigarette. Columns (2) presents an
OLS regression of the Canadian province tax rate on cigarettes on the federal
tax rate on cigarette and the average tax rate of the Canadian neighboring
provinces. We do the same regression in (3), by adding neighboring controls.
Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics (with the standard error
adjusted for clustering by province). Variables are defined in table 1 and
described in detail in the data appendix.
  
US NEIGH INC*103
C NEIGH INC2 *108
C NEIGH INC*103
US NEIGH GDP
US NEIGH INC2 *108
C NEIGH GRANT
CUS NEIGH GRANT
C NEIGH DENS*103
US NEIGH DENS*103
C NEIGH GDP
Dependent Variable
TAX: 
province cig. 
tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
TAX: 
province cig.
tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
TAX: 
province cig.
tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
-0.879
(0.88)
0.028 0.136 0.122
(0.15) (0.76) (0.34)
0.950 1.076 1.307
(4.50)** (5.23)** (2.53)*
2.969 2.759 3.741
(1.03) (1.10) (1.16)
-3.217 -0.618 -7.854
(0.96) (0.17) (1.02)
0.289 0.134 0.349
(1.01) (0.78) (0.80)
0.123 0.157 -0.732
(1.98) (2.19) (0.77)
-0.184 -0.326 -0.124
(0.97) (2.20) (0.56)
-24.353 -15.318 -40.901
(2.38)* (1.34) (1.47)
-35.633 -47.566 -29.490
(2.00) (3.56)** (1.21)
-1.351 0.280 -0.524
(0.24) (0.06) (0.08)
0.073 0.071 0.155
(3.60)** (2.41)* (1.31)
-0.783 -0.739 -1.341
(1.96) (1.56) (1.36)
3.346 3.219 5.290
(1.95) (1.60) (1.43)
-81.506 -36.185 -160.650
(1.22) (0.71) (1.27)
-0.091 -0.054 -0.200
(1.02) (0.67) (1.30)
-0.191 -0.131 -0.230
(1.02) (0.67) (1.30)
UNEMP
INC*103
INC2 *108
POP *107
Dummy=1 if the premier of the
Government belongs to the
Progressive Conserv.
Dummy=1 if the premier of the 
Government belongs to the Liberals
DENS
CHILD
GDP
AGED
dummy when equalization holds
EXPE
US NEIGH TAX
dummy when TAX higher than C
NEIGH TAX 
Interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a 
dummy=1 when TAX lower than C 
NEIGH TAX
Table 3: The impact of  federal tax on provincial tax
Federal tax-rate on 
cigarettes+federal sale tax
C NEIGH TAX
-0.022 -0.022 -0.139
(0.35) (0.42) (0.83)
0.118 0.157 0.190
(2.12) (2.65)* (1.45)
-1.618 -1.357 -2.035
(3.59)** (2.84)* (2.57)*
6.431 5.384 7.999
(3.45)** (2.79)* (2.62)*
0.523 0.498 0.672
(1.13) (1.18) (1.03)
-1.819 -1.661 -2.322
(1.33) (1.18) (1.01)
-0.074 -0.425 0.327
(0.21) (0.95) (0.55)
-0.006 -0.033 -0.043
(0.10) (0.50) (0.42)
1,030.884 803.276 1,421.467
(1.26) (1.27) (1.15)
-1,981.173 -2,155.575 -1,425.931
(2.42)* (2.39)* (0.98)
-55.140 -45.224 -35.135
(2.60)* (1.84) (0.99)
186.768 226.650 212.553
(1.00) (1.24) (0.82)
0.064 0.064 0.058
(1.18) (1.08) (0.79)
4.02 9.35 12.2
(1.00) (3.01)* (0.02)
17.180 11.184 27.553
(2.33)* (1.28) (1.66)
year effects no no no
province effects yes yes yes
Observations 110 110 110
R-squared 0.87 0.87 0.80
Overidentification test 0.04 0.19 0.45
Ftest on own controls (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ftest on NEIGH controls (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Ftest on province effects (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Constant
Federal unemployment rate
Federal GDP*106
Notes: Column (1) presents a 2 stages least squares estimate of a regression
of the Canadian province tax rate on cigarettes on the federal tax rate on
cigarette and the average tax rate of the Canadian neighboring provinces: we
do not instrument the federal tax. We do the same regression in (2), but
instrumenting the federal tax. In column (3) we add the interaction of C
NEIGH TAX with a dummy equal to 1 when TAX is lower than C NEIGH TAX.
Numbers in parentheses are robust t-statistics (with the standard error
adjusted for clustering by province). Variables are defined in table 1 and
described in detail in the data appendix.
  
US NEIGH INC*103
C NEIGH INC2 *108
US NEIGH UNEMP
C NEIGH INC*103
C NEIGH UNEMP
US NEIGH GDP
US NEIGH INC2 *108
C NEIGH GRANT
CUS NEIGH GRANT
C NEIGH DENS*103
US NEIGH DENS*103
C NEIGH GDP
Dependent Variable
TAX: province
cig. tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
TAX: province
cig. tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
TAX: province
cig. tax rate
(sales tax +
specific unit
tax)
3.061 3.014
(2.83)* (2.24)
-1.610 -0.119
(3.36)** (0.04)
-2.994
(1.83)
1.547 1.442
(2.99)* (0.56)
1.529 -0.162 -1.381
(2.18) (0.16) (0.50)
-0.204 1.424 -0.085
(0.03) (0.30) (0.01)
0.730 -4.434 0.329
(0.04) (0.38) (0.02)
-1.299 -1.306 -1.305
(0.86) (1.12) (0.92)
-0.078 0.293 -0.049
(0.07) (0.53) (0.05)
0.139 0.194 0.145
(0.26) (0.47) (0.34)
-22.874 -35.846 -23.927
(0.34) (0.84) (0.41)
-29.777 -12.644 -28.472
(0.40) (0.24) (0.50)
-11.854 -8.727 -11.661
(1.08) (1.08) (0.97)
0.064 0.072 0.064
(0.49) (0.58) (0.49)
-1.320 -1.355 -1.322
(1.36) (1.46) (1.40)
5.558 5.516 5.554
(1.76) (1.74) (1.71)
13.670 -89.590 5.699
(0.03) (0.40) (0.02)
interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a
dummy =1 when TAX higher than C
NEIGH TAX
Interaction of the federal tax rate with the
interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a dummy
=1 when TAX higher than   C NEIGH TAX
C NEIGH TAX
dummy when equalization holds
EXPE
GDP
Table 4: The effect of the the federal tax on tax competition
POP *107
UNEMP
INC*103
INC2 *108
dummy when TAX higher than C NEIGH
TAX 
interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a
dummy =1 when TAX lower than C
NEIGH TAX
AGED
Interaction of the federal tax rate with the
interaction with C NEIGH TAX of a dummy
=1 when TAX lower  than   C NEIGH TAX
DENS
CHILD
US NEIGH TAX
-0.143 -0.140 -0.143
(0.65) (0.71) (0.66)
-0.144 -0.150 -0.145
(0.62) (0.76) (0.67)
C NEIGH UNEMP -0.003 -0.047 -0.006
(0.01) (0.14) (0.02)
US NEIGH UNEMP 0.046 0.094 0.048
(3.08)* (3.03)* (3.05)*
C NEIGH INC2 *108 7.406 7.116 7.382
(2.63)* (2.55)* (2.44)*
US NEIGH INC*103 1.646 0.644 1.569
(0.97) (0.65) (0.90)
US NEIGH INC2 *108 -5.159 -2.304 -4.941
(1.13) (0.71) (1.02)
C NEIGH DENS*103 -0.214 0.306 -0.172
(0.10) (0.24) (0.10)
US NEIGH DENS*103 0.089 0.009 0.083
(0.37) (0.05) (0.36)
C NEIGH GRANT 1,453.538 1,470.081 1,456.913
(1.39) (1.71) (1.43)
CUS NEIGH GRANT -1,595.849 -1,821.874 -1,610.297
(0.89) (1.01) (0.90)
C NEIGH GDP 24.451 35.404 25.435
(1.15) (1.02) (1.17)
US NEIGH GDP 65.296 153.530 71.055
(0.31) (0.74) (0.31)
Constant 14.928 25.119 15.742
(0.45) (1.17) (0.58)
year effects yes yes yes
province effects yes yes yes
Overidentification test 0.80 0.86 0.89
Observations 110 110 110
R-squared 0.80 0.80 0.80
Ftest on own controls (p-value)  0.0033 0.0004 0.0000
Ftest on NEIGH controls (p-value) 0.0000 0.0134 0.0000
Ftest on year effects 0.1262 0.3365 0.0241
Ftest on province effects 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) are two stage least squares regressions of the provincial tax
rate on cigarettes on the federal tax rate interacted with the average tax rate of the
neighboring provinces, respectively when TAX is lower than C NEIGH TAX and TAX is
higher than C NEIGH TAX. Column (3) presents the same regression, including the
interaction of the federal tax rate with both tax regimes. Numbers in parentheses are
robust t-statistics (with the standard error adjusted for clustering by province). Variables
are defined in table 1  and described in detail in the data appendix.
  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Dummy=1 if the premier of the
Government belongs to the Progressive
Conserv.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
Dummy=1 if the premier of the 
Government belongs to the Liberals
